Introduction
Starting with the Rock (1986) model, institutional investors have played an important role in the theoretical literature on the pricing and allocation of initial public offerings (IPOs). Rock (1986) argues that these institutional investors with private information about the true long-run value of the shares of firms going public bid only on undervalued shares, leaving retail investors with a disproportionate share of overvalued IPOs. Thus, in the Rock (1986) setting, IPO underpricing is a mechanism to mitigate the adverse selection faced by retail investors, ensuring that they do not withdraw from the IPO market. A second strand of the literature is the bookbuilding literature (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989) ), which builds on the Rock (1986) assumption of informed institutional investors, and argues that the IPO bookbuilding process is a mechanism for extracting information from these institutional investors in order to use it to price shares in the IPO at the appropriate level. In their setting, underpricing is a means of compensating these institutional investors for truthfully revealing all value-relevant information useful in pricing shares in the IPO. A third strand of the literature (e.g., Chemmanur (1993)) views underpricing as a way of inducing information production by institutional and other investors about the firm going public.
This information is reflected in the secondary market price of the firm's equity as a result of post-IPO trading by these informed investors, moving it closer to the firm's intrinsic value.
1 Motivated by the above theoretical literature, in this paper we address the following empirical questions for the first time in the literature. First, do institutional investors really have private information about IPOs? Further, if indeed they possess private information, is all their value-relevant information incorporated into the IPO offer price, or are institutional investors left with residual information that they can profitably use in post-IPO trading? Second, are institutional investors able to realize significant profits from their participation in IPOs, thus getting compensated for the role they play in the IPO process, as postulated by the bookbuilding literature? While it has been documented (see, e.g., Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) , and Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) ) that institutional investors receive significant allocations in underpriced IPOs (where a considerable amount of money is "left on the table"), the ability of institutions to fully realize this money left on the table has not been studied. A related question is whether, even if institutions realize superior profits from selling their IPO allocations, they dissipate these profits (partially or fully) in post-IPO trading. 2 Finally, how do institutions sell their IPO share allocations? While it has been documented that institutions sell about 25.8 percent of the shares allocated to them during the first two days of post-IPO trading (Aggarwal (2003) ), the selling of IPO allocations by institutions beyond the immediate post-IPO period has not been studied. The answer to this question is not only important in its own right (since it has implications for the desirability of institutions as investors in IPOs), but is also essential to establish the amount of profits realized by institutions from their participation in IPOs. 3 We answer the above questions in reverse order, and organize our empirical analysis into four parts. First, we study the pattern of institutional sales of their IPO allocations over the long run post-IPO.
Second, we analyze the realized profitability of these institutional IPO allocation sales. This allows us to assess the extent of compensation that institutions actually receive for their participation in IPOs. Third, we examine the profitability of post-IPO institutional trading (i.e., profits from buying and selling shares in the secondary market alone). Fourth, we analyze the relation between institutional trading and subsequent long-run IPO performance. The latter two parts of our study allow us to answer the questions discussed earlier regarding the nature of the private information held by institutional investors.
In this paper, we make use of a large sample of proprietary transaction-level institutional trading data to answer the above questions. Our sample includes transactions from January 1999 to December order to infer institutional IPO allocations, we identify a subset of our sample institutions by matching with the Spectrum quarterly institutional holdings data. 4 For these identified institutions, we are able to compute their IPO allocations by combining our institutional trading data with quarterly holdings data reported by them. Therefore, we use the sub-sample of these identified institutions to study the long-run pattern and realized profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales (the first and second parts discussed above), and use all our sample institutions to study the profitability of post-IPO institutional trading and the predictability of institutional trading in IPOs (the third and fourth parts discussed above).
We present a number of new results on IPOs and institutional trading. In the first part of our analysis, we document the pattern of institutional IPO allocation sales over the long run post-IPO. We find that flipping during the first two trading days post-IPO constitutes 21.8 percent of their IPO allocations, similar to the findings in the prior literature. We present the first evidence in the literature on how institutions sell their IPO allocations in the long run. Within the first year, institutions sell 70.2 percent of their IPO allocations. In other words, institutions continue to sell significant portions of their IPO allocations beyond the immediate post-IPO period. Institutional IPO allocation sales drop sharply after month 1 and there is no spike in month 2, after underwriters stop monitoring investors' flipping activities, which usually occurs at the end of month 1. We interpret this result as evidence that underwriters' monitoring mechanism for flipping does not appear to be very binding for institutions. 4 Though the number of identified institutions is relatively small, they are larger on average, and collectively account for 8.7 percent of total trading volume reported in CRSP within the first year post-IPO. In other words, these 48 identified institutions account for 77.7 percent (8.7 percent / 11.2 percent) of trading in IPOs done by all our 419 sample institutions. Therefore, we do not lose much information by conducting our study of IPO allocations and allocation sales using the sub-sample of these 48 identified institutions.
Institutions hold their IPO allocations for 9.65 months on average. We find that institutions sell hotter (more underpriced) IPOs, younger IPOs, high-tech IPOs, IPOs with lockup provisions, and IPOs with poorer long-run performance faster.
In the second part of our analysis, we study the realized profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales, using actual transaction prices, and incorporating the impact of trading commissions and implicit trading costs. We document that institutional IPO allocation sales are highly profitable and institutions fully realize the money left on the table for their IPO allocations, both before and after accounting for risk factors. Sample institutions were able to realize 73.7 percent in terms of raw returns and 67.0 percent in terms of abnormal returns on their IPO allocation sales. By selling their IPO allocations, sample institutions collectively made $10.3 billion in raw profits and $9.4 billion in abnormal profits.
In the third part of our analysis, we study the profitability of post-IPO trading by institutional investors. Post-IPO institutional trading outperforms a buy-and-hold investment strategy in IPOs, suggesting that institutions continue to possess private information about IPO firms even after the IPO.
Institutions are able to outperform more when there is higher information asymmetry about the IPO firm, namely younger IPOs and IPOs underwritten by less reputable investment banks. However, institutions' post-IPO trading does not outperform or underperform the market in general. Larger institutions outperform a buy-and-hold strategy in IPOs by a higher margin than smaller institutions, after controlling for other factors.
In the fourth and final part of our analysis, we study the predictive power of institutional trading on subsequent long-run IPO performance. We document that institutional trading has predictive power for subsequent long-run IPO performance, even after controlling for publicly available information.
However, the predictive power decays over time, becoming insignificant after the initial three to four months. After a company goes public, it has to make a significant amount of information publicly available (e.g., audited financial statements), which reduces outsiders' cost of information production.
Therefore, our results suggest that institutions have a greater informational advantage over retail investors when the cost of producing information is higher, i.e., during the immediate post-IPO period. Institutions gradually lose their informational advantage as more and more information about the IPO firm becomes publicly available. We also find that trading by large institutions has more predictive power, after controlling for publicly available information.
Our paper considerably enhances our understanding of the role of institutional investors in IPOs.
Our results indicate that, consistent with information production theories, institutional investors are able (1989) ). Finally, the fact that institutional trading in the months after the IPO has predictive power for subsequent long-run IPO returns indicates that institutional investors retain a residual informational advantage over retail investors even after the IPO. Thus, while underpricing indeed seems to be a way of compensating institutions for revealing their private information as predicted by bookbuilding theories, our results indicate that institutions do not reveal their entire private information at the time of the IPO.
Consistent with this, the post-IPO trading of institutions is able to outperform a naive buy-and-hold strategy in IPOs, so that the superior profits institutions generate from their IPO allocation sales are not dissipated in post-IPO trading (allowing institutions to extract informational rents overall from investing in IPOs). Our results also show that larger institutions have a greater informational advantage relative to that of smaller institutions, indicating the existence of significant economies of scale in information production.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related literature.
Section 3 describes our sample and presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents our results on the pattern of institutional IPO allocation sales. Sections 5 and 6 present our results on the profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales and post-IPO institutional trading, respectively. Section 7 presents our results on the relation between institutional trading and subsequent long-run IPO performance. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of our results.
Related Literature
Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) show that first-day block sales can predict long-run IPO performance. Our result on the predictive power of the first two days of institutional trading is thus consistent with theirs. However, there are important differences between our study and Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999), and we extend their long-run post-IPO return predictability results in several directions. First, in addition to institutional trading immediately after IPOs, we study the predictive power of subsequent institutional trading (up to one year post-IPO), and find that institutions' predictive power early on diminishes over time. Second, unlike their study, which infers institutional flipping by identifying block sales in the TAQ data, we use transaction-level institutional trading data that include the direction of each trade. It is widely known that the algorithm for inferring trade direction, while useful, is far from perfect. Third, we are able to study institutional trading even when their trades are not blocks, and find that even trades from small institutions have some predictive power. This is especially relevant given recent developments in trading such as program trading and decimalization, which have caused dramatic reductions in institutional trade sizes. Fourth, instead of flipping alone, we study institutional net buying (buying minus selling) in IPOs, and thus provide a more complete picture. Since we continuously track post-IPO trading for one full year, in order to be included in our sample, an institution has to have trading data for at least 13 consecutive months. For example, in order for an institution to be included for January 1999 IPOs, the institution needs to have some trading data (in any stock, not just IPOs) in every month from January 1999 to January 2000. 9 Also sample institutions must have traded in at least one sample IPO within the first year post-IPO. 419 sample institutions satisfy the above criteria. The total annualized dollar principal traded is $4.4 trillion, the total annualized shares traded is 147.7 billion, and the total annualized commissions paid is $5.4 billion. For an average IPO, our sample institutions collectively account for 11.2 percent of total trading volume reported in CRSP within the first year post-IPO.
Identifying Institutions and Their IPO Allocations
In order to infer institutional IPO allocations, we identify a subset of our sample institutions by matching with the Spectrum quarterly institutional holdings data. We first compute the change in the number of shares in each stock for each institution in the Spectrum quarterly institutional holdings data.
We also compute the cumulative trading (buying minus selling) of each stock for each institution in our anonymous institutional trading data. We then identify our sample institutions by matching the two datasets based on quarterly holding changes and quarterly cumulative trading. We are able to identify 48 institutions using this method.
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Though the number of identified institutions is relatively small, they are larger on average. For example, the average annualized dollar principal traded is $10.5 billion for all institutions and $52.6 billion for identified institutions. These identified institutions collectively account for 8.7 percent of total trading volume reported in CRSP within the first year post-IPO. In other words, these 48 identified institutions account for 77.7 percent (8.7 percent / 11.2 percent) of trading in IPOs done by all our 419 sample institutions. Therefore, we do not lose too much information by conducting our study of IPO allocations and allocation sales using the sub-sample of these 48 identified institutions.
For these identified institutions, we are able to compute their IPO allocations by combining our institutional trading data with quarterly holdings data reported by them. This is done by using post-IPO quarterly positions reported by these institutions, and then adding the cumulative institutional trading up to the end of the quarter in these IPOs. We use the sub-sample of these identified institutions to study the long-run pattern and realized profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales, and use all our sample institutions to study the profitability of post-IPO institutional trading and the predictability of institutional trading in IPOs.
IPO Sample
We first identify all IPOs conducted in the U. performance (the differences in means are not statistically significant, but the differences in medians are).
Throughout this paper, we separately examine hot versus cold IPOs for most of our results. 
Identifying Institutional IPO Allocation Sales
In order to study the long-run pattern and realized profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales, we need an algorithm to separate institutional allocation sales from their buying and selling of IPO shares in the secondary market post-IPO. Simply put, the basic idea behind our algorithm is that, at any 
The Pattern of Institutional IPO Allocation Sales
In this section, we study the pattern of institutional IPO allocation sales and the determinants of the speed of institutional IPO allocation sales. As mentioned earlier, we use the sub-sample of identified institutions to analyze these questions. Table 2 reports results on the pattern of IPO allocation sales by identified sample institutions.

Fraction of Offer is IPO allocations received by identified sample institutions divided by total IPO Offer
Proceeds. Note that our sample institutions are a subset of the universe of institutional investors. Our identified sample institutions receive 12.7 percent of allocations per IPO on average, higher than their trading in IPOs (8.7 percent as mentioned earlier). They also receive higher allocations in hot IPOs (15.3 percent for hot IPOs versus 10.6 percent for cold IPOs). This is consistent with Aggarwal, Prabhala, and
Puri (2002), and Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) , who show that institutions receive higher IPO allocations than do retail investors, especially in hotter IPOs. (2002)). We answer this question in Section 5.
We find that our sample institutions flip 21. for Month 1; these differences are statistically significant). These results suggest that underwriters discourage flipping more actively in cold IPOs.
To characterize the overall speed of institutional IPO allocation sales, we compute the Average Holding Period, which is the value-weighted average number of trading days (divided by 21 to arrive at months) sample institutions hold their IPO allocations. For residual allocations held at the end of the first year, we impute an additional holding period of one year by institutions, since the average holding period by institutions for common stocks is about one year (Investment Company Institute (2004)). We find that institutions hold their IPO allocations for 9.65 months on average. They hold cold IPOs longer: the Average Holding Period is 10.87 months for cold IPOs versus 8.62 months for hot IPOs.
Determinants of Speed of Institutional IPO Allocation Sales
In this subsection, we study the determinants of the speed of institutional IPO allocation sales.
We run different specifications of the following regression: In models 1 and 2, the regression coefficients on Log(Age+1) are positive and significant, suggesting that institutions sell allocations in younger IPOs faster. Consistent with earlier univariate results, there is some evidence in models 1 and 2 that institutions sell hotter (more underpriced) IPO allocations faster. However, once more independent variables are included in models 3 and 4, the coefficients on Log(Age+1) and Initial Return become insignificant. Perhaps not too surprisingly, we find that institutions sell allocations in bubble period IPOs and high-tech IPOs faster. Interestingly, institutions also sell allocations in IPOs with lockup provisions faster. In terms of economic magnitudes, the Average Holding Period is 1.05 months shorter for IPOs with lockup provisions, 0.84 month shorter for high-tech IPOs, and 1.50 months shorter for bubble period IPOs based on model 4. Finally, institutions appear to hold IPOs with better long-run performance longer. In other words, institutions flip out of worse long-run performers faster, suggesting that they have private information about IPOs. We address the issue of whether institutions possess private information by studying the predictive power of institutional trading on subsequent long-run IPO performance in detail in Section 7.
Profitability of Institutional IPO Allocation Sales
Our results in the previous section suggest that institutions continue to sell significant portions of their IPO allocations beyond the immediate post-IPO period. In this section, we continue to use the subsample of identified institutions to study how profitable these allocation sales are to institutions and how much of the money left on the table is realized by institutions. 12 We are able to accurately measure the realized profitability of both institutional IPO allocation sales and institutional post-IPO trading. In addition to trading commissions (which directly reduce realized profits), implicit trading costs such as implementation shortfall (Perold (1988) ) could also be important and further reduce investors' realized profits. Our results account for both trading commissions and implicit trading costs, since we use actual transaction prices to calculate institutional investors' realized profits. 
Raw $ Realization Shortfall is given by Money Left on the
Profitability of Post-IPO Institutional Trading
Our results in the previous section show that institutional IPO allocations sales are very profitable, and institutions fully realize the money left on the table for their IPO allocations. In this section, we use all sample institutions to study the profitability of institutional post-IPO trading, and in particular, whether institutions outperform a buy-and-hold investment strategy in IPOs. We then analyze the determinants of institutional outperformance in post-IPO trading. Table 5 reports results on the profitability of post-IPO trading by all sample institutions. In Table   5 However, institutions do show some ability in trading IPOs in the secondary market, since they outperform a naive buy-and-hold investment strategy in IPOs, which is money-losing. Again, institutions' ability in post-IPO trading seems to stem from their ability to avoid "bad" IPOs, i.e., they outperform in hot IPOs, where the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are negative.
Determinants of Institutional Abnormal Outperformance in Post-IPO Trading
In this subsection, we study the determinants of institutional abnormal outperformance in post-IPO trading in a regression framework. We run different specifications of the following regression: (reputation rank lower than 9.1) and the trading is done by a large institution, and zero otherwise.
Our results in Table 6 show that institutions are able to outperform more when there is higher information asymmetry about the IPO firm, namely in younger IPOs and IPOs underwritten by less reputable investment banks (coefficients on both Log(Age+1) and Log(Reputation) are negative and significant). As for economic magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in Log(Age+1) 
Institutional Trading and Subsequent Long-Run IPO Performance
In the previous two sections, we studied the realized profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales and post-IPO trading. We now use all sample institutions to study whether institutional trading can predict subsequent long-run IPO performance. We extend Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) by using transaction-level intuitional trading data that include the direction of each trade and studying institutional net buying (buying minus selling) in IPOs. We also analyze the information content of institutional trading beyond the immediate post-IPO period. and Abnormal Returns are all highly positive (in results not reported here, these return differences are all statistically significant at the 1 or 5 percent level). For Month 3, the return differences are still positive but smaller (they are only marginally statistically significant). After Month 3, the return differences become smaller and sometimes are even negative (none of these later return differences are statistically significant). These results suggest that while institutions do possess private information immediately after an IPO, their informational advantage decays over time. This could be due to institutions trying to exploit their private information early on.
Can Institutional Trading Predict Subsequent Long-Run IPO Performance?
Can Institutional Trading Predict Subsequent Long-Run IPO Performance After Controlling for Publicly Available Information?
In this subsection, we study the relation between institutional trading and subsequent long-run IPO performance in a regression framework. The question here is whether institutional trading can predict long-run IPO performance after controlling for publicly available information (and factors known to affect expected stock returns: size and book-to-market). We run the following regression for each of the 13 trading periods: Table 7 reports the results of our regression analysis institutional trading over time and subsequent long-run IPO performance. The dependent variable is Subsequent Abnormal Return, which is the IPO one-year buy-and-hold return (starting one day after each of the 13 trading periods) net of the return on the matched Fama/French 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolio. Net buying is as defined in Section 7.1. Definitions of other independent variables can be found in Section 4.2. Table 7 Panel A show that our univariate results plotted in Figure 2 are robust after controlling for various variables reflecting publicly available information. In particular, institutional trading (Net Buying) can predict long-run IPO performance even after controlling for publicly available information. In other words, the informational advantage possessed by institutions appears to be derived from private information. In terms of economic significance, for example, a one standard deviation increase in Net Buying during the first two days leads to an increase of 7.8 percent in Subsequent Abnormal Return (8.4 percent for Net Buying during the first month). The overall pattern of the informativeness of institutional Net Buying after controlling for publicly available information is very similar to the univariate results plotted in Figure 2 , i.e., the predictive power of institutional Net Buying decays over time, and becomes insignificant after the initial four months post-IPO. After a company goes public, it has to make a significant amount of information publicly available (e.g., audited financial statements), which reduces outsiders' cost of information production. Therefore, our results suggest that institutions have a greater informational advantage when the cost of producing information is higher (during the immediate post-IPO period). Institutions may gradually lose this informational advantage as more and more information about the IPO firm becomes publicly available. As for the control variables, older IPOs (and, to some extent, IPOs underwritten by more reputable investment banks) tend to have better long-run performance. Hotter IPOs, IPOs issued during the bubble period, NASDAQ IPOs, and
Results in
IPOs with lockup provisions tend to have worse long-run performance.
All institutions are further partitioned into large versus small institutions (using $10 billion annualized dollar principal traded as the cutoff), and the regression results are reported separately for them in Table 7 Panels B and C. The results show that while the predictive power of Net Buying by large institutions is robust after controlling for publicly available information, the predictive power of trading by small institutions mostly disappears. It appears that while large institutions produce and make use of private information that is orthogonal to publicly available information, small institutions mainly make use of publicly available information. One reason could be that large institutions may be able to afford many in-house analysts, while small institutions may not be able to do so.
Discussion of Results and Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the profitability and informativeness of institutional trading in IPOs using a large sample of proprietary transaction-level institutional trading data. We analyzed the pattern and profitability of institutional IPO allocation sales, the profitability of post-IPO institutional trading, and the predictive power of institutional trading for subsequent long-run IPO performance. (1989) 
Appendix: Details of Algorithm for Identifying Institutional IPO Allocation Sales
For each IPO/institution pair, we implement the following algorithm recursively everyday starting from the first IPO trading day ( 1 t = ) to trading day 252 ( 252 t = ). Note that the algorithm below needs to be implemented recursively every trading day, since whether a given sale of IPO shares by an institution is classified as IPO allocation sales depends on the number of shares bought and sold in the secondary market till that point in time by that institution. For example, if an institution sells 100 shares of an IPO on the first day and then buys 500 shares of the same IPO on the second day, the 100 shares sold on the first day is clearly allocation sales, since the institution could have obtained the 100 shares it sold only from IPO allocations. However, if we reverse the order of these two trades (buys 500 shares on the first day and then sells 100 shares on the second day), the 100 shares sold cannot be classified as allocation sales, since, conservatively, these 100 shares can be viewed as part of the 500 shares bought by 
We can calculate the cumulative IPO position from "pure" post-IPO trading (buying and selling in the secondary market, excluding IPO allocation sales) as follows: 
The IPO allocation shares sold on day t is then given by:
And finally, shares bought and sold in "pure" post-IPO trading excluding IPO allocation sales are given by: Table is . The last column tests the significance of the differences in the means and medians between the two groups. P-values, which are in parentheses, are based on t-tests for the difference in means and the Mann-Whitney tests for the difference in medians. Statistical significance is indicated by *** for one percent level, ** for five percent level, and * for ten percent level. (2004)). The last column tests the significance of the differences in the means, with p-values in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated by *** for one percent level, ** for five percent level, and * for ten percent level. Table 6 ). Most independent variables are as defined before. Young/Large is a dummy variable that equals one if the IPO firm is young (younger than the sample mean age of 14 years) and the trading is done by a large institution (more than $10 billion in annualized dollar principal traded), and zero otherwise. Low Reputation/Large is a dummy variable that equals one if the IPO is underwritten by a low reputation lead underwriter (reputation rank lower than 9.1) and the trading is done by a large institution, and zero otherwise. The unit of observation is an IPO/institution pair. P-values, which are in parentheses, are adjusted using White's robust standard errors with clustering on IPOs. Statistical significance is indicated by *** for one percent level, ** for five percent level, and * for ten percent level.
(1) 
Figure 2. Institutional Trading and Subsequent Long-Run IPO Performance
This figure plots the relation between trading in IPOs by all sample institutions over time and subsequent long-run IPO performance. As before, the first year post-IPO is divided into 13 trading periods. Net Buying for each trading period is the total shares bought by all sample institutions minus the total shares sold by all sample institutions normalized by the Shares Offered in the IPO. For initial sample IPOs, the lowest, middle three, and highest quintiles of Net Buying are categorized as Low, Moderate, and High IPOs, respectively. Subsequent Raw Return is the IPO one-year buy-and-hold raw return starting after each of the 13 trading periods. If delisted, the CRSP delisting return is used. Subsequent Abnormal Return is the difference between Subsequent Raw Return and the matched Fama/French 25 Size and Book-to-Market portfolio buy-and-hold value-weighted return. The mean High -Low differences in Subsequent Raw and Abnormal Returns are plotted in the figure. 
